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Much recent literature on the wage effects of immigration assumes that the return to 
capital, and therefore the average wage, is unaffected in the long run.  If immigration is 
modelled as a continuous flow rather than a one off shock, this result does not necessarily 
hold.  A simple calibration with pre-crisis US immigration rates gives a reduction in 
average wages of 5%, larger than most estimates of its effect on relative wages. 
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I. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a vigorous debate over the impact of immigration on the 
US labour market, particularly regarding the wages of unskilled native workers.  A 
common exercise in the literature (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2005; Ottaviano and 
Peri, 2005, 2006, 2008; Aydemir and Borjas 2006) is to assume a multi-level Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function for the US economy, with the labour 
input sub-divided by education, experience and (in some cases) migration status.   
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between different groups of workers combined 
with the supply of immigrants in each group are used to find the effect of immigration on 
relative wages.  The latest estimates of the long run effect on US born high school 
dropouts are between +0.3% (Ottaviano and Peri, 2008) and -3.8% (Aydemir and Borjas, 
2006).  This is only a small share of the observed 24.4% fall in this group’s wage, 
relative to the average, between 1990 and 2004 (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, p. 32). 
The  absolute effect of immigration on wages, however, also depends on the 
behaviour of the capital stock.  The literature usually assumes a constant return to capital 
in the long run, which implies that immigration does not change the average wage (of 
natives and immigrants combined).
 1  Ottaviano and Peri (2006, p. 10) give the most 
explicit justification: ‘As for the long-run response of capital, any model of growth 
(Solow, 1956; Ramsey, 1928) as well as empirical evidence imply that capital adjusts to 
maintain its real return (and capital output ratio) constant.’  Under this assumption, the 
changes in relative wages are all that needs to be considered in the long run.   
This approach, however, implicitly treats immigration as a one-off shock, which 
increases the size, but not the growth rate, of the labour force.  While this may be 
appropriate for particular episodes such as the Mariel boatlift (Card, 1990), it is clearly 
                                                 
1 The CES framework makes changes in average and relative wages additive. 3 
 
not an accurate description of migration in general.
2  Once immigration is treated as a 
continuous flow, adding a little bit to the population every year, it can be seen that 
immigration increases the growth rate of the labour force, reducing the capital stock per 
worker on which the average wage depends.  In Part 2, I derive the effect of a change in 
labour force growth on the average wage in a Solow–Swan model.  Part 3 is a simple 
back of the envelope calculation of the size of this effect in the United States, which 
implies a reduction of around 5% in the average wage.  Part 4 concludes. 
 
II. Theory 
Consider the standard Solow–Swan model e.g. in Romer (2006, ch. 1), with a Cobb–
Douglas production function in aggregate labour L and capital K as in Ottaviano and Peri 
(2008),  
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and δ is the depreciation rate.  The steady state with a constant capital stock per effective 
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where  n  and  g  are the growth rates of the labour force L  and labour augmenting 
productivity  A  respectively.  Combining Equations 1 and 2 allows us to express the 
capital stock per actual worker K/L as  
                                                 
2 Ottaviano and Peri (2006, p. 10): ‘Immigration is an ongoing phenomenon, distributed over years, 
predictable and rather slow . . . It is reasonable, therefore, to think of this issue more dynamically with 
investments continuously responding to the flow of immigrant workers.’ 4 
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Now, setting the (average real) wage w equal to the marginal product of labour from 
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the semi elasticity of the average wage with respect to the population growth rate, which 
is the percentage change in the wage resulting from a one percentage point increase in 
labour force growth.  This is a level effect – in the new steady state the wage will 
continue to grow at rate g but on a permanently lower path. 
 
III. Empirics 
How big a fall in the average wage is implied by recent US immigration rates in this 
framework?  Romer (2006, p. 25) gives a labour share α of 2/3 (c.f. 0.67 in Ottaviano and 
Peri, 2008, p. 12), and depreciation plus population and productivity growth (δ+n+g) of 
0.06, implying a value of -8⅓ for the semi elasticity in Equation 6.  Legal migration of 
people aged between 15 and 64 to the US was around 1 million per year for fiscal years 5 
 
2004 through 2006 (Office of Immigration Statistics 2007).
3  In addition Hanson (2006, 
p. 7) estimates a net illegal inflow of 350 000 to 580 000 per year.  In 2006 the size of the 
civilian labour force was 151 million with a participation rate of 66.2% (Bureau of 
Labour Statistics, 2008).  The same ratio applied to immigrants (probably an 
underestimate, particularly for illegals) would mean an annual addition of about 1 million 
– between 0.59 and 0.69 percentage points – to labour force growth, implying that 
immigration reduces the average wage in the steady state by between 4.9% and 5.8%.  
This is larger than the maximum 3.8% fall in dropout wages, relative to the average, 
mentioned in the Introduction. 
  One might wish to adjust the size of the labour force upwards for the illegal 
resident population.  The Department of Homeland Security (2006) estimates this at 10.5 
million in 2005.  Rounding up to 11 million for 2006 and applying the same participation 
rate as above would only lower the average wage effect to -4.7%.  To the extent that 
illegal immigrants are already included in the labour force statistics (plausible since it is 
assumed that most are captured by the census), however, this adjustment is unnecessary.  
The above analysis assumes a closed economy with respect to capital.  Will 
investors respond to lower wages and higher profits with capital inflows that restore the 
previous rate of return?  The United States is surely too large to be a price taker in 
international capital markets, even if capital was perfectly mobile.  Furthermore, much of 
the capital inflow in the relevant period was driven by foreign central banks, which 
would not automatically increase their holdings of US assets in response to a fall in US 
wages.
4  Even if capital mobility eliminated a majority of the effect of migration on the 
                                                 
3 2006 is used to avoid the effects of the US housing crash and following recession, as well as for 
compatibility with the preceding literature.   
4 Capital could even flow the other way if lower US wages make its tradables more competitive, reducing 
the trade deficit at a fixed exchange rate and therefore lowering foreign central banks’ accumulation of US 
dollar reserves. 6 
 
average wage, there could still remain an impact of comparable size to the changes in 
relative wages estimated in the literature. 
Another objection might be that the lack of variation in the capital-labour and 
capital-output ratios shown in Ottaviano and Peri (2006, p.p. 30, 50) rules out significant 
effects from immigration.  However, these ratios only show convergence to a long run 
trend without specifying the determinants of that trend.  A lower rate of immigration 
would have meant a different steady state, with slower labour force growth and higher 
capital-labour and capital-output ratios.  This point is given further force when one 
considers that the 1960s and 1970s were a time of particularly strong growth in the native 
labour force as the baby boomers moved into the labour market (see e.g. Bureau of 
Labour Statistics, 2008).  High immigration in more recent decades may be considered as 
merely picking up the slack, i.e. preventing a large decline in the growth rate of the 
labour force, which would have had the results mentioned above. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The effect of immigration on native wages depends crucially on the behaviour of the 
capital stock.  Modelling immigration as a one off shock, as is done in the literature, 
minimizes its effects by implying that the average wage is unchanged in the long run.  
Treating immigration more realistically, as a continuous flow, reveals that it changes the 
rate of growth of the labour force, which affects the capital stock per worker and thus the 
average wage, even in the long run.  A simple calculation of this effect in a Solow–Swan 
model implies that pre-crisis sized US immigration flows would reduce the steady state 
average wage by around 5%.  Even if the assumption of a closed economy makes this an 
overestimate, it suggests that the effect of immigration on average wages may be of the 7 
 
same order of magnitude as the relative wage effects which have received so much 
attention.  Finally, it is perhaps worth repeating that the closed economy Solow–Swan 
model, while simple, is the same model used in the literature to justify the assumption of 
a constant rate of return on capital, and it is therefore appropriate to use it in a comment 
on that literature. 
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